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A

SHORT INQUIRY

INTO THE

NATURE OF LANGUAGE,

WITH A VIEW TO

ASCERTAIN THE ORIGINAL MEANINGS

OF

SANSKRIT PREPOSITIONS;

ELUCIDATED BY

COMPARISONS WITH THE GREEK AND LATIN

BY

SIR GRAVES C. HAUGHTON, KNT., K.H.

M.A., F.R.S., M.R.A.S., R.I.A., &c.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR,

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M.DCCC.XXXIV.

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THOSE parts of the following observations which relate to the Verb and the Preposition were printed nearly twenty years ago, in the author's Grammar of the Bengali Language; and the remarks on the Voices of the Verb appeared in his edition of the Institutes of Menu, Sanscrit and English. These were collected together, and, with the remaining elucidations on language in general, printed by way of an Introduction to his Dictionary of the Bengali and Sanscrit Languages. Advantage was taken of that occasion, to print some additional copies, with a view to a separate publication; but they have lain by him for a period of six years, under the conviction that they were not of sufficient interest to draw the attention of mere classical students. That they are now attempted to be made known, arises from the fact, that they have met with the approbation of some of the first scholars of this country and of the continent; and that there was every danger of their perishing, either by decay or damp.

9th JULY, 1839.

SHORT INQUIRY,

&c. &c.

INTRODUCTION.

In every inquiry which we make into the nature of language, we are bound to ascertain its relation to the other phenomena of nature, and to consider it as something more than a detached and subservient instrument of thought. When we examine language with care, it seems almost as mysterious as every thing else which surrounds us. We are apt to think that those things with which we are familiarised from childhood possess nothing either profound or perplexing. When, however, we inquire into the remote principles of language, we find that it shares in the mystery and obscurity in which all the phenomena of nature are involved.

When language began to be employed by man, he was not yet aware of the relation in which he stood to the rest of nature; nor did he know that he was himself formed and directed by laws that rendered him subservient to the circumstances by which he was surrounded, and to which his own nature bore a close analogy. But when we investigate language, and rise from effects to causes, we are compelled to feel that man was merely a passive instrument, if not in its formation, at least in its improvement; and we acquire the conviction that we must thoroughly comprehend the nature of this first offspring of the human mind, before we can hope to arrive at any legitimate conclusion as to the laws that regulate the phenomena of mind itself. But if language has its basis in the principles of nature, we must not forget that its perfection is the result of Progression, which is likewise the foundation of all improvement.

Man in the infancy of society, himself a mere infant in thought, was impelled by the pressure of his wants to the formation of a medium by which he might communicate with his own kind. The

puppet of Nature, he was led by her to the formation of an instrument that has enabled him, by affixing names to his ideas, to turn general sentiments, which alone he could otherwise have felt, into individual thoughts. His mind being a sort of mirror that reflected every thing he felt and saw, he was driven by the principles implanted in his nature to the use of articulate sounds, with which as with colours he painted his own perceptions.

That language adapted itself in its infancy merely to represent the physical phenomena of nature will be evident by an analysis of its parts. All things material were designated by the NOUN, while the motions of these objects were indicated by the VERB in its simplest form. Such was the first step in language. The next was to invent words that should limit and define the points to which the motion implied by the verb tended, and thence resulted the PREPOSITION; and it will be found that every subject may be conveyed intelligibly, though with some tautology, by these three parts of speech, and they consequently constitute the foundation of language. To express the physical qualities of the noun, it was only necessary to join to it some other noun which possessed in a prominent degree the quality which it was wished to attribute to it. Thus to express the different colours, such as *green, red, white,* &c. the names for *grass, rose, snow,* &c. or some other objects with the same striking qualities, were employed; so also the name for *a lion, a fox, an ass,* &c. served to designate the qualities of *courage, cunning, stupidity,* &c.; and these became the first *Adjectives.** The *Adverb* was employed instead of a whole phrase to complete some accessory idea of the verb, such as the nature, manner, quality, or intensity of its motion or action. From this it is evident that the adjective defined the noun in the same way as the adverb did the verb. The junction of one thing with another was intimated by the *Conjunction.* The *Pronouns* for *I* and *thou* must have been of the earliest invention in language, as they represented the speaker and the person spoken to, perhaps even before either had a name. The *Interjection* was employed to rouse the attention of another, or to mark the excitement felt by the person employing it. The *Article* (derived from the demonstrative pronoun) was the last improvement of speech, and is only found in those languages which have advanced to their utmost perfection of form.

But if we are anxious to push our enquiries to the utmost limits of human investigation, we shall find a reason for the uniform and universal laws that govern the philosophy of language in every varied condition and peculiarity of the human race. It must be evident that speech was either conferred upon man at his creation, or arose imperceptibly as it was required by his wants. If the first, we must

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* It was owing to his having considered the abstract nature of qualities, that Adam Smith was led into the error of supposing that adjectives must have cost a great effort to the human mind in their invention. The nature of qualities is of very difficult conception; but their designation by an adjective, it will be seen, was very easy.

suppose it was once perfectly adapted to nature and to the social and intellectual relations in which he was to stand to his fellow man. But if it arose gradually, it was called into existence by the exigencies of his situation and the circumstances by which he was surrounded; and in either case it must be considered as the reflex of his sensations and perceptions, and consequently will be in exact relation to the general laws of nature. It is on this account that the *Noun* and *Verb* had each its archetype in MATTER and MOTION; and the *Preposition* that marked local relation, and the *Termination* or *Auxiliary* that denoted the tenses of the verb, had each its original in SPACE and TIME long anterior to the appearance of man on the earth. *Language is thus forced to adapt itself to an abstract model that eludes all investigation.* Space and Time being the mere concomitants of matter and motion, and having therefore a relative and not an absolute existence, language will be often found to notice them only by implication;* and this might be adduced as a further proof of the dependence of language on those remote principles of nature, which influence the mind of man without his being conscious of their agency.

It is owing to this plastic influence exerted over language and the imitative tendency of the mind, as well as the analogies to which it has recourse in all its deficiencies, that words which were originally participles or adjectives are employed permanently as nouns; and that nouns themselves acquire the force and nature of verbs or prepositions, and are classed, unconsciously by the mind, with those parts of speech to which they have, by a new use, acquired an affinity. And in the same way that such new words become either nouns, verbs, &c. so did the first primitive sounds conform to that abstract model which existed before either words or man, and which language adapted itself to delineate, and has, as it were, reproduced or reflected with considerable accuracy and fidelity. Hence, whatever may be the *etymological* sense of Nouns, Verbs, and Prepositions, they must ultimately represent the various modifications of Matter and Motion, Time and Space: for language would be a mere jumble of sounds, barely sufficient to indicate the more pressing wants and sentiments of our nature, if it had not had some guiding principles to which it originally conformed.

In consequence of the connection existing between the elementary principles of nature, and to which language unconsciously conforms, every investigation respecting the Noun, Verb, and Preposition† must

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* It may be seen that language often only notices them by implication; for when we say *he walked to town*, both space and time are implied; and when we say *the bird flew* over *the field*, though space is expressed by the preposition *over*, still the verb *to fly* implies both space and time; for all motion must be *through* space and *in* time. But independently of the different tenses which specifically mark *time*, and the prepositions which designate the different relations of *space*, language necessarily comprehends one or other of these two categories in every primitive word; e. g. a *house* must exist both in space and time.

† Though the Preposition only marks *local relation*, it can in no way be omitted in an investigation into

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be conducted with a due consideration of their mutual dependence. To consider any one of them without reference to the other two must lead to a partial, limited, and unsatisfactory result. These three parts of speech, therefore, being the mutual complements of one another, the truth can be alone elicited by considering them together. If it is conceded that Prepositions originally implied *local relations*, and the position seems hardly possible to be denied, Verbs must then be allowed to denote the different kinds of physical motion produced by the objects represented by Nouns. Hence there is an indissoluble connection existing between Nouns, Verbs, and Prepositions.

Such is the nature of the first or primitive state of language; but it deposes this physical character as soon as it is employed to represent those abstract relations, which, in proportion to the extent and accuracy with which they are comprehended by any individual, raise him, in the scale of reason, almost as much above the rest of mankind, as man is elevated above the brute.

OF THE NOUN.

NOUNS may be divided into two classes, that is to say into *concrete* and *abstract*.

Concrete Nouns are the names of such things as are perceived by the organs of sense, such as *a house, a man, a tree,* &c. As a further example, by the ear we perceive *a sound,* by the eye *a colour,* by the nose *a scent,* by the palate *a taste,* and by the skin or touch *the air;* not one of which could we have discovered by any other organ than that which makes them respectively known to us. Concrete Nouns, therefore, are the names of *things* made known by the senses.

Abstract Nouns are the names of mental perceptions, whether they relate to *actions, acts, results, states, modes, relations, powers, qualities, numbers, degrees, sensations,* or *passions.** Abstract Nouns, therefore, are the names of such things as are perceptible only to the mind. It will be evident that language to be definite, and therefore perfect, ought to have a precise and distinct termination for each class of abstract words. Such a provision would be of wonderful aid to abstract speculation, and

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the basis of language, as the motions of all things in nature have their limits, which are alone defined by this part of speech; and it is as necessary to the Verb as those terminations or auxiliaries which mark time past, present, or future. It is on this account that it is almost invariably found compounded with it, as in Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin, or put immediately after it, as in English.

* Examples: The ACTION of *striking, running,* &c. produces the ACTS called *a stroke, a run,* &c.; so the ACTION of *bearing* produces the RESULT called *a birth.* The STATE of *sleeping results* in *sleep,* and of *dying* in *death.* The term *result* is of indispensable use: for instance, a *birth* is not an *act;* and the Sanskrit language has a particular form for this class of abstract ideas. Such words are usually formed by the termination তি *ti,* e. g. কৃতি *kriti, a make.* See Sir Charles Wilkins' Grammar, Rule 830.

relieves the mind from much unnecessary labour, as it places the conceptions of the writer in the exact light in which they are intended by him. Any one who will take the trouble of analysing the variety of senses in which the word *vision* is employed in the English language, or still more particularly the word *motion*, will see that the sense in which these words may be employed by a writer or speaker, can alone be discovered by a painful application of thought. In the same way the French have only one word for *conscience* and *consciousness*, which must often be the cause of obscurity. The Sanskrit and Latin are both particularly rich in such distinct forms; but some confusion is occasionally observable in both these languages (though less in the former than in the latter) owing to the terminations having been improperly added by careless or illogical thinkers. For this, however, every allowance is necessary as mental perceptions do so closely approximate to one another, that it is frequently very difficult to discriminate to which class they properly belong; and indeed, in some instances, the same idea may be referred to more than one class, and some of the classes likewise would admit of subdivision.

A complete classification of the distinct perceptions of the mind is a great desideratum towards a perfect analysis of thought. Were a philosophic language ever to be invented this enquiry would be a preliminary step of indispensable necessity; as well as that of determining the distinct local relations for which prepositions ought to be used, and by limiting each to one definite sense, to prevent all chance of confusion and misconception.*

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* A systematic classification, such as is here contemplated, would be of great value in forming the mind for metaphysical inquiries. An analysis of any process of reasoning, carried on with a reference to its distinctions, would afford the student a safe clue in many of the intricacies of thought in which he is often bewildered; and would give a clearness, and a consequent conviction of abstract truth, which the mind in vain seeks for when left to its own intuitive powers. Such an artificial aid would lead to the instant detection of sophistry in abstract speculations; for without a clear conception of the distinct differences of abstract words there can be no certainty in our conclusions. The employment of such a system of analysis would be an excellent conclusion to ordinary grammar, and might be termed *abstract* or *transcendental grammar*. Matters of feeling and opinion cannot from their nature admit of demonstration; but abstract questions, if the terms were properly defined, and *the class of ideas to which they relate* distinctly kept in view, ought to be as capable of proof as the things from which they are abstracted. Of the importance of always attending to the class of ideas to which any word belongs, every reasoning mind will be fully convinced by a little reflection. For instance, philosophers may be asked when they speak of the 'propagation of motion,' do they mean *change of place* or the *something* ponderable or imponderable that produces such an appearance? If the former, the word is clearly an abstract noun; but if the latter, it is a concrete noun, and refers to a different class of ideas, and must consequently give rise to perfectly different conclusions in any process of reasoning.

The noun of itself, without some verb being expressed or understood, cannot form a rational expression; it is on this account that, though the noun may seem the most obvious part of speech, yet still its precise meaning can be understood only by a reference to a verb; it being by means of this part of speech that all the operations of indicating, comparing, and reasoning are performed and determined. Hence there is an obvious necessity for bearing in mind the reciprocal influence of Noun and Verb, and also, as has been already shewn, of the Preposition, in every investigation into the nature of any one of these three fundamental parts of speech.

OF THE VERB.

The following sketch of the Verb in its different voices or states has been written in a concise way, to explain its real nature to the enquiring student.*

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

In the infancy of language the verb merely denoted the modes of motion peculiar to the simplest objects of nature, as *to fly, to run, to strike,* &c., but in process of time, as language became perfect, the verb adapted itself to the expression of every want of the human mind, and in this state it is considered as denoting *action, being,* or *suffering.* But it is solely by a metaphorical use that language is fitted for describing abstract ideas, and for this purpose the verb divests itself of its essential attribute, which is *motion* in a physical sense.

In all inquiries into language, the origin and formation of the verb has ever been deemed a subject of the highest interest. Either the first primitive language consisted simply of Substantives, which were insensibly moulded into Verbs and Prepositions, or the whole three sprang almost simultaneously into existence; but whether they are words originally and especially invented to mark motion, or have been adapted by degrees to this end, they at last acquire the same nature as if they had been specially formed for the purpose.

DEFINITIONS.

When any sort of motion is expressed to be going on independent of the will of the agent, as, *the wood burns,* the verb is termed neuter; but the neuter state is in the agent, and not in the verb, which only conforms to the state of the noun.

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* These observations on Verbs and Prepositions are extracted from the Author's *Bengálí Grammar.*

If a verb denotes any particular kind of motion depending, or conceived to depend on the will of the agent, it is Active but intransitive; that is, it implies voluntary motion, which is commonly called Action, as, *he runs*, &c.; and when the motion passes on to an object on which it reposes, it is Active and Transitive, as, *he strikes the child.*

Again, where motion is communicated from one agent to another, the verb expressive of the motion is termed Causal; as *he caused the horse to gallop;* but the Cause exists in the first agent; the second is the Instrument; and the action of the verb remains unaltered in nature, but is marked in all languages by some modification in the sound of the word, as করিতে (*karite*) *to make,* করাইতে (*karáïte*), *to cause to make,* in Bengálí; or, as in our own language, by compounding a verb implying agency with any infinitive expressive of the particular motion to be produced.

When an object is affected by any action in which it has no agency, and is put in the nominative case, the Verb expressive of the action is termed Passive; but the passion or suffering is in the object and not in the Verb; and in some languages this peculiar use of the Verb is simply marked by a modification of the Verb itself, as *amo*, I love, *amor*, I am loved, in Latin; and قَتَلَ (*katala*), *he slew,* and قُتِلَ (*kutila*), *he was slain,* in Arabic.

In our own, and in most derivative languages, the passive sense is conveyed by an attributive expressive of past time, i. e. by a passive participle, and the affirmation of the different times is expressed by an auxiliary verb.

The verb is termed Impersonal when it denotes any particular mode of motion resulting from the spontaneous operations of nature, as *it rains;* or from the fitness of things, as *it behoves me to go.* Hence Nature and Necessity are the real nominatives to such verbs.

It thus appears that the Verb, whether we term it Neuter, Intransitive, Transitive, Causal, Passive, or Impersonal, was equally simple in its origin; and that it is essentially the same in whatever voice it is used. The particular action, state, or passion it is supposed to imply, exists only in the agent or object, and not in itself. Still in almost all languages the sound of the verb is found modified to mark the voice in which it is used, though it is occasionally to be met with unaltered in sound, whether employed in a transitive, intransitive, or neuter sense. Our own words *to bear, to burn, to feel,* &c. shew that this may be done without any misconception.

From the foregoing remarks on the nature of the verb, it results, that Motion is its essential attribute; and that those who hold it to be a mere connective, have not, perhaps, sufficiently considered its origin; and have been led to observe its apparent use, which is often metaphorical, rather than its essential quality, which indicates different kinds of motion. But even when it is considered as a mere connective, it would be more correct to call it an affirmative.

It would seem that the real cause why the nature of the verb has been so much controverted, has simply arisen from the very partial and unconnected view which has been taken of it in every research

into language. It is only by considering it with reference to the Noun and the Preposition, which are its natural complements, that we can arrive at any just ideas upon the subject. But viewed in connection with these, its real nature becomes obvious. (See the remarks on the Prepositions.)

After use had fixed the first forms of the verb, the rest were easily brought into existence by that love of analogy which is inseparably connected with the nature of the human mind. In our own language we can by convention form any number of verbs from nouns or adjectives. Thus we have made *to shoe, to salt, to better, to blacken,* &c., a peculiarity that tends to a singular conciseness and precision of expression.

These remarks on the Verb have been hazarded under the hope of putting the matter in a clear and consistent light to the learner; for the Verb is the very life of language; the Noun is what it describes, and the Preposition, when requisite, defines the direction of its motion or action. Hence these three are the basis of all language, and must be employed or understood in almost every proposition; but the other parts of speech may be either expressed by a circumlocution, or even altogether rejected.

OF VOICES.

As it often becomes a matter of difficulty to ascertain the exact Voice to which a verb belongs, the following remarks, in addition to what has been just said, are added, with a view of putting the subject in a clear light.*

It is to be remarked, that in Sanskrit the fourth conjugation contains the great body of the neuter verbs, while at the same time it is that which in its middle voice is identical, in form, with the passive. The object is now to shew, that whatever purpose is effected by the letter য *ya*, which is the distinctive sign of the passive voice, is equally accomplished by the same letter for the fourth conjugation. In all languages there is an affinity between passive and neuter verbs, and there are some verbs that might be almost indifferently classed under the passive or neuter voice: such instances frequently occur in Manu, the elucidation of which has led me to treat the subject at length.

The verb জায়তে *jáyaté, he is born,* is classed by the Sanskrit grammarians in the fourth conjugation, though, had they ranged it with the passive verbs, it would not have been changed in the slightest degree in form. That they have not done so shews the correctness of their notions of grammar. Dr. Johnson, in his Dictionary of the English Language, states that the verb *to be born* is neuter-passive. The verb is originally passive, for when all its parts are supplied, it means *to be borne by a mother;* but in its popular and elliptical use, being employed without any reference to its agent, as when we say, *he was born last year,* it becomes truly a neuter verb, for it then merely affirms the

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* These remarks on the voices of verbs are extracted from the Author's edition of the *Institutes of Manu*, Vol. I. p. 329.

first appearance of a child in the world. The verb *nascor*, in Latin, may be contested as belonging to the passive by its form, and to the neuter by its use; for it answers the conditions of a deponent verb, which requires a *passive* form without a passive signification. The French derivative of *nascor*, i. e. *naître*, is laid down to be neuter in the dictionary of the French Academy. In *Hindústání* the passive and some other verbs are conjugated with جانا *jáná*, *to go*, and none but neuter ones with ہونا *hónú*, *to be*; and in that language *to be born* is پیدا ہونا *paidá honá*, and therefore *neuter*. Thus we see that we have the analogy of language for considering *to be born* as neuter by its use, whatever may be the conclusion we come to by a reference to its derivation.

Perhaps the following reason for the solution of the equivocal nature of some neuter verbs may be of service, as affording a clue for determining their classification, and to shew *why* there is that similarity between the fourth conjugation and the passive voice in Sanskrit; and between all neuter and passive verbs.

The Subject both in the passive and neuter voice has no *will* or *choice* in the action implied by the verb: thus, in the sentence *he dies*, the subject is affected by a STATE over which he has no control and which he would resist if he could; and in that of *he is killed*, he suffers from an ACTION he cannot avoid. In both these instances the subject is exposed to but one result, independent of his *will;* the having or not having which, constitutes the real distinction in all animal sufferings and actions. It is on this account, I conceive, that there is such a similarity between the fourth conjugation and the passive voice, for whether the subject of the verb be exposed to a *state*, or to an *action*, which he cannot avoid, he must be the *object*. If a conjecture might be offered as to the sense of the increment य *ya*, which is the distinctive sign of both the passive and the fourth conjugation, I would say, that it is connected with या *yá* or ये *i*, *go*, and that it fills the same office in Sanskrit which is done by the derivative *jáná*, *to go*, in *Hindústání* and the other dialects.

To define the difference in doubtful cases between a neuter and a passive verb, we have therefore only to consider whether the subject suffers from a *state* or an *action;* that is, whether there is the agency of natural causes, or of an individual, in producing the effect implied by the verb.

But if it be necessary, on the one hand, to distinguish accurately between the passive and the neuter, it is equally important to discriminate between the neuter and the intransitive verb, in nice and doubtful cases; for the neuter verb holds an intermediate place between the passive and the intransitive: and here again the same test will give us the true definition; namely, if the action implied by the verb depends upon its subject, we may be certain it is not neuter, and that the verb is consequently either transitive or intransitive. Had a rule of this kind, which would afford a logical arrangement, been kept in view, we should not have our grammarians differing about the nature of neuter verbs. That they have been much perplexed by making distinctions upon imperfect grounds of judgment, may be seen by referring to Mr. Lindley Murray's English Grammar, on the Verb. The presence or absence of volition in the nominative can alone enable us to determine the nature of the verb, and consequently

by that test are we to be guided whether the nominative is the *agent* or the *object*. Upon this view of the matter I have arranged the different verbs as follows: and have given examples, lest any doubt should arise as to their classification.

VOLUNTARY.

The Nominative THE AGENT.	Intransitive,	as *He runs, stands, sits.*
	Transitive,	— *He kills, strikes, &c.*
	Reflective,	— *He kills, &c. (himself).*
	Causal,	— *He causes to kill, strike, &c.*

INVOLUNTARY.

The Nominative THE OBJECT.	Impersonal,	as *It rains, thunders, snows, &c.*
	Neuter,	— *He dies, sleeps, drowns, &c.*
	Passive,	— *He is killed, struck, &c.*
	Causal Passive,	— *He is caused to be killed, &c.*

OF PREPOSITIONS.

THE various local relations of objects are denoted by Prepositions; but though all languages do not in every case make use of the same relations, yet there are some primary ones that are common to all, as *up, down; in, out,* &c. As those persons who have not analysed language may find it difficult to attach a definite idea to the words *local relation,* it may be rendered more intelligible by saying, it is that idea which results from the mind contrasting together two things with reference to their mutual position: thus the sky is *above* the earth; *above* therefore implies the relation between sky and earth; but by altering our point of view we may say, the earth is *beneath* the sky; *beneath* therefore implies the relation between earth and sky. It is therefore evident that they were the first abstract words possessed by language.

The Noun is the name of a thing; the Verb describes its mode of motion or action; and the Preposition defines the direction of that motion; that is, whether it is *to, from, by, against, under, over,* &c. any given object. Hence its primary sense is that of LOCAL RELATION.

Thus Prepositions were originally employed to define the *relative* situations of the different objects of nature, which were of course, in the infancy of society, the first things that required the employment of speech. But in proportion as the impressions received through the senses began to be compared and comprehended, the operations of the intellect were developed, and almost imperceptibly, a

new application of language was required to express the various relations of abstract ideas. And though there may seem to be no necessary connection between abstract notions and the relations of material things; yet, as the comprehension of the former gradually arises out of the consideration of the modes of material existence, so this first and simple language, which had resulted from the necessity of describing whatever came within the scope of the senses, was at last employed to denote the abstract conceptions of the mind; because it afforded a natural analogy, and saved the trouble of a new, and perhaps impossible, convention. Hence it must be purely metaphorical, as often as it is employed in the description of mental perceptions.

The obvious distinction between language which had been invented to describe natural objects, and its figurative application to denote abstract ideas, must never be lost sight of in practice. For, when Prepositions are employed for the purposes for which they were invented, they mark the relations of *local* position; as, "The bird flew *to, above, before, behind,* &c. the tree." But when the same Prepositions are borrowed by a figurative use to express abstract conceptions; as, "Fancy triumphs *over* reason," or "The mind revolts *against* oppression," they imply nothing more than a mere mental contrast; and by convention we agree to think that what we assimilate in our minds to *above* and *before,* &c. is better than what we designate by *below* and *behind,* &c. though there can be neither *up* nor *down, before* nor *after,* in what is purely mental.

From what has been remarked above, it will be evident that Prepositions were, in the origin of language, almost as indispensable as verbs; for without their aid few verbs could convey a definite idea, as the Prepositions alone denote the *direction* of the action of the verb. Perhaps they had been more properly termed *directives, definitives,* or *limitatives* than Prepositions. (See the Remarks on the Verb.)

In the foregoing concise view of the nature of Prepositions, it is not pretended to give a decided opinion how they have come into their present form and use in the Sanskrit language, but merely to say that the closest and most impartial consideration bestowed on the subject confirms the belief already expressed, that as they are the natural complement of the noun and verb, whether they are primitive words or are employed in a figurative sense, they at last express but *one* distinct relation, which is in its primary use a *local* one, and implies either *up* or *down, in* or *out,* &c. A reference to some words employed in the Bengálí, Hindústání, and other dialects springing from the Sanskrit, is of great value in elucidating the manner in which such words are divested of their original nature, and restricted to a given use. The word সমীপ *samípa* originally meant, as is clear by its etymology, *in the vicinity of water,** but it is now used for *in the vicinity* or *near* generally. So the Bengálí par-

* অপাং সমীপে, *Manu* II, 104. This etymology of the word সমীপ is supported by Sanskrit grammarians: see Sir Charles Wilkins' Gram., Rule 1177.

ticiple হইতে *hoïte, being,* as a preposition implies *from.* In Hindústání پاس *pás, near,* is a corruption of the Sanskrit form পার্শ্বে *párswe, in the side;* and میں *meṇ, in,* seems to be derived from the Sanskrit মধ্যে *madhye, in the middle.* These instances, which we can still trace to the original language, are sufficient to shew how words totally different in their nature may come at last to imply but one relation; and to this state they are brought by the very nature of the human mind, and those external causes that control and force language into such special classes, as Noun, Verb, and Preposition. The strongest reason that could be assigned for the primitive nature of Sanskrit Prepositions is the fact of their being often the shortest words in the language, and being incapable of decomposition or analysis except in the instance of the word পরা. It ought not likewise to be forgotten that the inseparable Prepositions, being compounded with verbs and nouns, have been preserved by this union from the corruptions and changes which would have affected them in a separate state; and this may be one reason why there is less difference between the Prepositions in Greek, Latin, and Sanskrit (when they are the words of the same stock) than between the other words that are found to co-exist in these three cognate languages.

Prepositions are a very important part of speech; and particularly in so pure a language as the Sanskrit. A little attention to the etymology of the language may finally save the learner much time and trouble; as well as give him a more perfect knowledge of its structure than he could acquire from merely learning the words by rote. And in those instances where the words cannot be resolved by any general rules of etymology, we must bear in mind that many must be founded upon allusions which are lost in the remoteness of antiquity. It should not be forgotten, likewise, that terms of more modern formation are generally less pure than the more ancient ones, owing to the compounds being formed without a reference to the distinction between the physical and the figurative senses of the elementary words. It is owing to this defect, which comes on with the growth of language, that Greek words compounded with a preposition admit of such unsatisfactory analysis. Indeed though the Greek language has retained many of the peculiarities of the Sanskrit, particularly in the *forms* of the verbs, yet in its words it is so much corrupted, that we might be inclined to believe that it was introduced amongst a people whose organs of utterance were as unfitted for correctly imitating the original sounds, as those of our Saxon ancestors were for pronouncing the Norman French.* Still, it is possible, that much of this apparent corruption arose from the circumstance that the Greeks, like many of the modern nations, adopted an alphabet unfitted to express the sounds peculiar to their language.

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* It probably is owing to this, and to the adoption of the Phœnician alphabet, that there is so much that is anomalous in the Greek language. The languages that are written with alphabets derived from the Phœnician class do, with the exception of the Greek and Latin, omit the vowels, while those of Hindu origin

In conclusion it remains only to say that in the foregoing view of the Noun, the Verb, and the Preposition, the truth has been elicited by a reference to their *mutual dependence* on one another; and whoever considers the subject in the same connected point of view must come to the same result. As a *general rule*, whenever any verb implies a *physical* motion, such as *to fly*, *to run*, *to leap*, &c. the preposition employed will be found to express a *local* relation, as to fly *up*, to fly *down*, &c., and that such simple senses of the prepositions must be their primary significations is as clear as that the figurative meanings are those that are borrowed from them. To find, therefore, as a general rule, the original sense of a Preposition or Verb, we have only to consider whether it is employed in a physical or a figurative sense.

OF INSEPARABLE PREPOSITIONS.

In assigning the meanings of the following Prepositions, the *primary*, that is the local relation which they convey is printed in capitals; while those senses which arise from the primary idea by implication, or by a figurative use, are printed in italics. But it must not be thence concluded that they have really so many various significations. The multitude of nicely discriminative Prepositions in our own language, is the cause why we almost invariably reserve each of them to define but *one* relation of things; though in figurative language what denotes *before* would equally well imply *first*, or *against*, and so on for the others. But even among our own Prepositions, though we could (as far as regards meaning) most accurately substitute other particles that should convey every signification of *by*, as well as its primary sense of NEAR, yet custom has determined that we must use it, instead

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origin almost invariably express them. The Greeks, in adapting the Phœnician alphabet to the wants of their own language, were obliged to form vowels out of consonants. Would not this fact lead to a suspicion that they had already been accustomed to an alphabet in which the vowels were always written; and is not this idea confirmed by bearing in mind that, unlike the Phœnician which is written from right to left, they oscillated between the two modes, and after using the Bustrophedon finally recurred to the same plan as the nations from which they derived their origin and language, and wrote from left to right, in addition to making use of vowels? The question of the *digamma*, which is involved in so much obscurity and has given rise to so much controversy, has entirely arisen out of the adaptation of the Phœnician alphabet to a language for which, by the nature of its construction, it was singularly unfitted. The principle on which the Phœnician alphabet has been formed is one main cause why the Hebrew, Arabic, and other kindred dialects for which it was originally invented, have been preserved in such purity to the present time. But it must be remembered that it was framed expressly for this particular class of languages.

of any other, in very many instances; and this word affords a good example of the way in which the following primary and figurative meanings of the Prepositions are to be understood.

If the figurative meaning assigned to one Preposition may seem occasionally to encroach upon that laid down for another, it should be remembered, that a word must necessarily, when metaphorically employed, be often equally capable of conveying the same idea as one whose primary signification is very different; for this reason the idea of *excellence* or *superiority* may be equally well denoted, in figurative language, by the word *before*, as by *above*, or *beyond*.

The Prepositions cannot be added at pleasure to a root or word; but their use must be determined by the custom of the language. Two or three are very often prefixed to one root, and, though rarely, even four may be found added, as in the word সমভিব্যাহৃত *surrounded, attended upon*, in which there are সং, অভি, বি, and আ prefixed to the root হৃ *take*. Except when such words have been formed by poetical license, we must suppose that these Prepositions have been added successively to modify the meaning of the first word. Thus we must suppose that হৃত was modified by the addition of আ, and that আহৃত was again modified by the addition of বি, and ব্যাহৃত by অভি, &c.; and though these intermediate forms may no longer be found, it is no proof that they did not once exist in some state or other of compound verb or verbal derivative.

It may still be objected that there is a large body of nouns, regularly formed by the union of prepositions with roots, that seem quite absolute in the meanings assigned to them, and for the use of which convention can alone be pleaded; and that therefore any reference to the original meaning of the prepositions and roots can be of no utility. To this it may be replied, that undoubtedly at first sight such words as আহার *áhára, food*, ব্যাহৃতি *vyáhriti, a sacred sentence*, &c. though compounded from the prepositions আ *á* and বি *vi* and the root হৃ *hri, to take, to seize*, &c. can hardly be forced into the sense assigned to the increments of which they are formed. If, however, we reflect a little on the subject, we shall see that they have not acquired these senses in an arbitrary way, but conformably to certain principles which an attentive enquiry into the language cannot fail to discover. Thus the verb আহৃ *áhri*, in strict accordance to the signification of its component elements, means "*To take* (any thing) *to* (one's self);" hence the substantive আহার *áhára* denotes, "That *which is taken to* himself by any one," i. e. food, nourishment. The verb ব্যাহৃ *vyáhri* signifies "*To utter, to express, to speak*;" whence the substantive ব্যাহৃতি *vyáhriti** means

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* It is not without interest to see how these forms arise in language: আহার *áhára* appears to be a modification of the imperative singular, employed in the same way as we do the Latin *recipe* for a noun: ব্যাহৃতি *vyáhriti*, and such forms, are evidently modifications of the perfect participle. So in Latin this part of speech seems to have given rise to such nouns as *evectus*, carriage, conveyance; *questus*, complaint, &c.

"*Whatever is uttered or spoken,*" i. e. A sentence. The close connection of nouns such as these with the verbal roots of the language, has not escaped the observation of the native Hindu grammarians and commentators, who frequently state at once the etymology and the meaning of a substantive, by merely assigning the verb, whether simple or compound, which has given origin to it. The two words just alluded to would, according to the method of the Pandits, be thus explained: আহ্রিয়তে ইতি আহারঃ, ব্যাহ্রিয়তে ইতি ব্যাহৃতিঃ. In the same way in English an *oversight* implies *the thing which is overseen, provision* is *the thing which is provided*, &c. It must be clear that this is one of the inevitable expedients to which the human mind has recourse to abridge useless prolixity of discourse, and at the same time to preserve those analogies which are the only guides that can secure the certainty of not being misunderstood. It is unnecessary to extend these examples further, as the sagacity of the learner will soon lead him to trace out the origin of such words from the instances here brought to his mind.

Mr. Wilson, the learned Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Oxford, in the Preface to the second edition of his valuable Sanskrit Dictionary, remarks upon the vague and arbitrary manner in which he conceives the Sanskrit prepositions are used in composition with the roots; but as it appears to me that there is a perfect analogy in the manner in which they are employed, I have ventured to quote his observations, and to analyze his examples according to the views about to be explained.

"It is also difficult," says Professor Wilson, "if not impossible, to provide in one language an equivalent for every shade of meaning which the terms of another may be made to convey, especially in a language like the Sanscrit, in which compound verbs and their derivatives are often used in a vague and arbitrary manner, or even when they may be thought to offer some connexion with their original import, do so in a remote and indeterminate degree. It would be easy to multiply instances of this nature, but the following will be sufficient at present.

"The verb শ্রি 'to serve' when combined with the prefix আঙ্ most commonly means 'to have recourse to for asylum or support.' This idea, although it may be considered as the basis of the various applications made of the derivatives of the verb, is not always very evident in such phrases as these: (1) স্ববাহুবলমাশ্রিতঃ Confiding in the strength of his own arm;' (2) বাতায়নাশ্রিতা Standing at a window; (3) আসনমাশ্রিতঃ Seated on a seat; (4) ময়ূরপৃষ্ঠাশ্রয়িণা গুহেন By SKANDA riding on the back of a peacock; (5) বীর্য্যমুপাশ্রিত Displaying valour, (6) কামমাশ্রিত Affected by desire; (7) ঊর্জাশ্রয়° বচন° High-spirited speech; (8) সংস্কৃতমাশ্রিত Speaking Sanscrit; (9) প্রকৃত্যাশ্রয়ঃ প্রত্যয়াশ্রয়ো বা নিষেধঃ A prohibition regarding either a crude noun or an affix, &c. Now here, neither sitting, nor standing, nor riding, nor speaking can in any way be regarded as the proper interpretations of আশ্রি and its derivatives, and it might convey an erroneous idea of their real purport so to render them in a dictionary, although they may be legitimately expressed in translations by similar equivalents." *Preface*, p. ix.

The compound verb আশ্রি *ásri*, properly, must be limited to signify "*to resort or have recourse to* (a person or thing for any purpose, e. g. for asylum, support, &c.)." The sense of the noun আশ্রয় *ásraya* may thence be easily deduced by the Hindu method above alluded to: আশ্রিয়তে ইতি আশ্রয়ঃ "*Whatever is resorted to* (for any purpose) is আশ্রয় *ásraya, a resource.*" To this primary meaning of আশ্রি may be traced back all the different senses which its derivatives admit or demand in the combinations enumerated by Professor Wilson. The first phrase may be literally rendered, "Having recourse to the strength of his arm;" the second, "Having recourse (or resorting) to a window;" the third, "Having recourse to (availing himself of) a seat;" the fourth, "By SKANDA resorting to (availing himself of) the back of a peacock;" the fifth (appears to be inserted by mistake, but the additional preposition উপ *upa* does not seem to affect the sense in any great degree) "Having recourse to valour;" the sixth, "Having recourse to love (i. e. yielding to the power of love);" the seventh, "Speech which has recourse to vigour or energy;" the eighth, "Resorting to (using, employing) the Sanskrit language;" and the ninth, "A prohibitive rule which resorts or applies to either a crude noun or a suffix."

GENERAL RULE.

WHEN a Preposition is prefixed to a *verb* or *participle* it has then the force of an ADVERB. But when it is prefixed to an original *noun* it then assumes the nature of an ADJECTIVE.

A want of attention to this simple distinction is the cause why such compounds appear to be so capricious and uncertain in their significations.

আ *á*. TO, AT: figur. *perfect, complete.**

This Preposition denotes the relation subsisting between two things which both extend to the same point, hence it defines the limit of the action of any verb; as *he went* to *the house:* i. e. up to *the house*. If prefixed to a root implying *going*, it makes it to mean *coming;* and if to a root signifying *giving*, it makes it imply *taking;* because the root only expresses some kind of motion generally; thus what *goes to* any one, comes to him; and again what is *given to* any one, is implied to be taken. Its use as a prefix to all words but verbs, may seem rather obscure, except we remember that junction with what we desire implies completeness and perfection; thus আভা *ábhá, splendor,* from ভা *bhá, shine*. This Preposition will be found to be as nearly as possible the reverse of অপ *apa*. It is

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* Agreeably to what has just been said, the primary LOCAL RELATION expressed by any Preposition is printed in capitals, and the figurative senses are given in italics.

identified with the Greek α, and the Latin *ad*, in which the *d* is pleonastic, as in *prodesse* and *prodeo*, without the same necessity for its insertion, as in these two examples, where its use is to prevent any hiatus in sound. In original Sanskrit grammars it is written আ° .

অপ *apa*, OFF, or AWAY: figur. *inferior, bad.*

This Preposition may be considered as the reverse of আ *á*, as it marks the relation subsisting between objects which are *off* or *away* from one another; hence it denotes disjunction. Prefixed to a verb of motion it makes it imply separation; as অপগত *apagata, gone* away, *or* off; and added to any other kind of root or word, it deteriorates, or reverses the sense; because disjunction implies imperfection; as অপকৃত *apakrita, hindered*, from কৃ *kri, do;* অপচয় *apachaya, loss*, from চি *chi, accumulate.* It is identified in origin with the Greek ἀπὸ, the Latin *ab*, and the English *off.*

প্র *pra.* FORE, or BEFORE: figur. *prior, exceeding, excellent, very.*

Prefixed to a verb of motion, it will of course seem to imply progressive motion, as *forth, forward*, &c.; but the Preposition merely marks the direction of the motion implied by the verb. As that which precedes, exceeds, and is generally conceived to be *better* than that which follows; and as that which is before, is *beyond* the thing it is in contrast with, this Preposition serves to mark *priority, excess, excellence*, and *intensity.*

It is identified in origin with the Greek πρὸ; the Latin *pro* and *præ;* but *pro* seems generally to express the primary idea, and *præ* the figurative senses. And, finally, it is the same as the English *for* or *fore.*

পরা *pará.* OPPOSITE: figur. *over, across, contrary, reverse.*

The relation intended by this Preposition expresses the situation of anything which is *opposite* to something else; as the further bank of a river,* &c.; hence it implies, 1. The position of any thing

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* This is the only preposition which admits of analysis; it is therefore of singular value in throwing light upon the history of these primitive words. The preposition পরা *pará* implies the *relation* that exists between two lines that are exactly opposite and therefore *parallel* (παρ' ἀλλήλοιν) and *equal* to one another. In Sanskrit the near shore of a river is termed বার *vára*, but the opposite shore is called পার *pára*, almost the very word we are considering; the word পর *para* too means *other, beyond*, and has given birth to the Greek περὰ. In Latin we have *par*, adj. *equal, even, corresponding*, and from thence *par*, a pair, a match, an equal, and from this has sprung the French *pair*, the English *pair* and *peer:* all these senses arise out of the idea of two things exactly *opposite* and therefore *equal* to one another; and this Preposition, whether employed in Sanskrit or Greek, is so true to its origin, that it always implies a reference to two things, one of which is meant to be *opposite* and *equal* to the other: so a *paradox*, παράδοξος,

is

opposite or *over* the way; so পরাক্রম *parákrama* (over-*step*):* any great exertion; as *strength, prowess, valour*, &c. and পরাগ *parága* (over-*going*): *an eclipse; dust*, &c. 2. *Contrariety;* as পরাক্ *parák* (*going* across): *crooked, crookedly.* 3. What is *reverse;* as পরাঙ্মুখ *paránmukha* (*face*-reversed): *having the face* averted; and পরাভূত *parábhúta* (*become* reversed); *overcome.* It might equally well denote what is *parallel,* or *equal to;* but it is very little used, and almost every instance of its occurrence has been exhausted in the foregoing examples. It seems exactly to correspond to, and to have a common origin with the Greek παρὰ and the Latin *par.*

অধি *adhi.* OVER: figur. *superior* (in station, quantity, quality, or degree).

It marks the relative position of something *over,* or *above,* another; and hence denotes that the action of the verb passed *over,* or *above* some given object; as অধীত *adhíta* (gone *over*), i. e. *perused.* Prefixed to nouns, it denotes their superiority in station, quantity, quality, or degree, according to their meaning.

নি *ni.* IN, or WITHIN, ON, UPON: figur. *entire, perfect, complete, ceasing, refraining.*

This Preposition marks the relation between two things, one of which is contained by the other; as নিচিত *nichita* (*collected* in): *full, complete,* from চি *chi, accumulate.* The idea of *wholeness, perfection,* and *completeness* naturally arises in considering any object as having all its parts *within* itself. As what remains *in,* is implied to be in a state of *cessation* or *refraining,* this Preposition is occasionally employed to express both these states; so নিবৃত্ত *nivritta* (*turned* in): *ceased,* from বৃত্ *vrit, turn;* and নিবরা *nivará* (refraining *from a choice*): *a virgin,* from বৃ *vri, choose;* because anciently females had the right of choosing a husband, who is hence called বর *vara,* which properly signifies *a choice.* It is sometimes apparently confounded with নির্ *nir.* In origin and meaning it is the same as the Greek ἐν, and the Latin and English *in.*

নির্ *nir.* OUT, or WITHOUT: figur. *void,* or *destitute of.* নিঃ *nih,* নিশ্ *nis,* নিষ্ *nish,* নিস *nis,* are forms of which it is susceptible, according to the nature of the first letter of the word to which it is joined.

The relation existing between two things of which one is *outside* of the other, is denoted by this Preposition; hence it serves, without any ambiguity, to mark *destitution,* or *privation;* as নিরাকৃতি *nirákriti* (without *a form*): *formless.* But even its most literal meaning will convey, under another point of view, an opposite sense; as নির্বচন *nirvachana, speaking out, an explaining or narrating,*

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is an opinion contrary to the *usual* one. The *opposite* bank of a river, called *pára,* therefore naturally suggested the relation intended to be conveyed by the Sanskrit পরা *parά,* and the Greek παρά.

* The meaning put between parentheses is that which I derive from the word by Etymology, but those which immediately follow it are taken from the Dictionaries of the language.

&c.* It agrees exactly in sense, but not in origin, with the Greek ἐξ, the Latin *ex*, and the English *out*.

সং *sam.* WITH, or BESIDE: figur. *complete, perfect.*

সঙ্ *sang*, সঞ্ *san*, সণ্ *san*, সন্ *san*, সম্ *sam*, are forms which it will be found occasionally to assume, according to the letter with which the word to which it is prefixed commences.

This Preposition denotes the relation existing between things which are *beside* one another; hence it conveys the idea of *accompaniment, completeness,* and *perfection.* The Greek σὺν, and the Latin *cum, con,* seem perfectly identified with it in origin and signification.

অভি *abhi.* BEFORE: figur. *first, better, against.*

The relation existing between objects, of which one is *before* or *in front* of the other, is expressed by this preposition; as অভিমুখ *abhimukha* (before *the face*): *present.* As what is *before* may be considered as *first* and *better* than other things with which it has a relation, this Preposition is sometimes employed for that purpose; as অভিজাত *abhijáta* (first, *or* better-*born*): *noble.* It seems to be of the same origin as the Latin *ob.* The difference between it and প্র *pra,* may be, that the latter expresses something before, without relation to distance; while অভি *abhi* conveys the idea of what is immediately before, or *in front.*

অনু *anu.* AFTER: figur. *following, imitating, successive.*

When of two things one is *after* the other, the relation existing between them is expressed by this Preposition; as অনুগ *anuga* (*going* after): *following.* So what is done *after* any thing else, implies *imitation;* thus অনুকার *anukára* (*a doing* after): *imitation, resemblance.* It further serves to mark regular *succession,* as অনুক্রম *anukrama* (*step* after *step*): *order, due succession, arrangement.*

উৎ *ut,* or উদ্ *ud.* UP: figur. *high, elevated, superior.*

This Preposition agrees exactly with our *up,* and marks the relative position of any thing that is *up* or *above* something else: hence its figurative senses. It corresponds in sense to the Greek *ava.*

অব *ava.* DOWN: figur. *low, contemptible, bad.*

It is the reverse of the preceding Preposition, and marks the relation between things one of which is below the other, and added to a verb implies that its action had a downward tendency; as অবতার *avatára,* (*passing* down) *descent, incarnation,* from ৃ *trí, pass;* and অবগত *avagata,* (*gone* down

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* Here we have an instance of the General Rule already laid down that the *nature* of the word to which the preposition is added reacts on the preposition and modifies its meaning: in this instance, being added to the *verbal* noun the sense is reversed: this is one cause of the obscurity in which this branch of grammar has been so long involved.

through, as a passage in a book,) i. e. *comprehended*, or *understood*, in which latter word an analogous metaphor will be observed to prevail. It deteriorates or reverses the sense of nouns to which it is prefixed, by the same figurative use as অপ *apa*, because what is beneath another is considered inferior when used in a figurative sense; thus অবরস *avarasa*, a bad *taste*, from রস *rasa*, *a taste*, and অবরূঢ *avarúdha*, *dismounted*, from রুহ্ *ruh*, *mount*. It corresponds in sense but not in origin to the Greek κατὰ.

উপ *upa*. NEAR, or BY: *similar*, *inferior*, *subordinate*.

When two things are *near* each other, their relative position is marked by উপ *upa;* as উপগত *upagata* (*gone* near); *approached*, from গত *gata*, *gone*. What is *near* another in kind, is *similar* but *inferior;* therefore উপনাম *upanáma* (near or almost a *name*): a by-*name*, *a nick-name*. উপধর্ম্ম *upadharma* (similar *to a law*, *a* subordinate *law*): a by-*law*. There seems to be a perfect resemblance between this Preposition, in signification and origin, with the Greek ὑπὸ and the Latin *sub*, though in the latter language the figurative has usurped the place of the primitive sense.

বি *vi*. APART: figur. *peculiar*, *distinct*, *different*, *without*.

This Preposition denotes the relation in the state of a thing that is *apart*, or *separate* from another; thus বিক্ষিপ্ত *vikshipta*, (*thrown* apart): *scattered*. Hence it figuratively implies *peculiarity*, or *distinctness*. It expresses the same idea as in common to our own and other languages, when we say any thing has a "*peculiar* form;" by which we mean that it has a form *apart*, or *distinct* from something else, and which may be either good or bad by convention, but more commonly the latter. Thus বিরূপ *virúpa* (peculiar *form*): *deformed*, *monstrous*. As the idea of *privation* naturally arises from that which expresses separation, this Preposition is frequently so employed; as বিফল *viphala* (without *fruit*): *fruitless;* and in this sense it is identified with the Persian بی *bí*. It seems to agree in sense and origin with the Latin *de* and *di*, which are perhaps corrupt forms of *ve*, as found in *vecors* and *vesanus;* but it is perfectly preserved in the Latin *vidua*, which is identical with the word বিধবা *vidhavá* (*vi* without, *dhava*, a husband): whence also the Saxon ꝑıꝺpa, from which comes the English *widow*.

পরি *pari*. AROUND: figur. *entirely*, *thoroughly*.

This Preposition denotes the relation between things one of which is *around* something else; as পরিক্ষিপ্ত *parikshipta* (*thrown* around): *surrounded*, *entrenched*. Hence it figuratively conveys the idea of any thing *entirely* done; because what is done all around implies completeness, or finish; as পরিপূর্ণ *paripúrna*, entirely, *or* quite *full*. It seems to agree in every respect with the Greek περὶ, and the Latin *per*.

প্রতি *prati*. AGAIN, BACK AGAIN, OVER AGAIN, AGAINST: figur. *resistance*, *repetition*, *reflection; much*.

It denotes the relation existing between things which by repetition return *again* in a sort of order. This idea is suggested by the winding back and forward of a rivulet,* or of a path, the coil of a rope, &c. Hence it marks, 1. *Resistance;* as প্রতিক্ষিপ্ত *pratikshipta* (*flung* back again): *rejected; repelled, resisted.* 2. *Repetition;* as প্রতিকৃষ্ট *pratikrishta* (*ploughed* again): twice *ploughed.* 3. *Return;* as প্রত্যুত্তর *pratyuttara* (*answering* back again): *reply.* 4. *Reflection;* as প্রতিচ্ছায়া *pratichháyá* (*shadow* back again): a *reflection, image,* or *picture.* And from this repetition arises the idea of *intensity;* as 5. প্রতিশ্রিষ্ট *pratisrishta* (*distinguished* again and again): *renowned.* It is the exact equivalent of the Latin *re.*

অতি *ati.* BEYOND: figur. *excessive, great, very.*

The relation subsisting between objects, one of which is *beyond* the other, is signified by this Preposition; as অতিনৌ *atinau, beyond the boat,* অতিপতন *atipatana* (*going* beyond): *transgression.* Hence it conveys the idea of *excess,* as অতিদান *atidána,* excessive *liberality;* and অতিবৃদ্ধি *ativriddhi,* great *increase,* অতিদূর *atidúra,* very *distant.* It expresses exactly the same relation as the Latin *trans,* and the Greek μετὰ.

অপি *api.* UPON.

This Preposition, which is so common in Greek, is so rarely employed, that it might have been omitted without inconvenience. It seems to denote the relation of any object that is *upon* another; as অপিনদ্ধ *apinaddha* (*bound* upon): *accoutred.* As a conjunction its use is very common, implying *moreover, also, likewise,* which seems to corroborate the sense here assigned to it. It is of the same origin as the Greek ἐπὶ.

সু *su.* GOOD:† figur. *proper, excellent, fit, beautiful, kind, easy, pleasing, very,* &c.

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* Mankind in the infancy of language must have found the idea of repetition extremely difficult, and if we bear in mind that the English words two-fold, three-fold; the Latin *duplex, triplex,* and the Sanskrit *dwiguna, triguna* (two twists, three twists), all convey ideas borrowed from some material objects, we shall be convinced that it is to such things that the speaker must have had recourse to suggest this idea to another. A folding screen or a fan conveys the idea exactly of a thing which is repeated in exact order; but in the infancy of society a winding stream, the folds of the skin, or the coil of a rope, would present the most obvious images.

† It must strike the scholar that the meaning of GOOD assigned to this Preposition, and that of BAD to the next, is contrary to the principle laid down that every preposition implied *local relation:* this objection is so obvious that it requires explanation. The prepositions, according to the nature of the word with which they were compounded, acted either as adverbs or adjectives, and were consequently the earliest words of that kind possessed by language. The first adjectives required would be *good* and *bad,* and the question imme-

This Preposition is only employed to enhance the value of nouns and adjectives; hence it conveys, according to the nature of the word to which it is prefixed, the idea of 1. *Perfection*, or *goodness:*

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diately occurs which of the prepositions would best imply these two ideas. Independently of the general reasoning that might lead us to a just conclusion, we have the aid afforded by analogy.

In Latin *propè* means NEAR, and from it arises the adjective *proprius*, and thence comes likewise the French *propre* and the English *proper*, meaning *good, fit*, &c. From *proprius* likewise descends *proprietas*, property. In Sanskrit too the preposition सु *su* seems to have entered into the adjective स्वस् *su+as*, *own*, and the noun स्व° *su+am*, *property*, hence we see why we have the Latin *suus* (*su+us*) *his own*, implying also *proper*, *due*, *lawful*. Now if we were to ask how land would be apportioned out among a population beginning to feel its value, certainly the law would be that each man should take that which was *nearest* to him, and thence *vicinage* would he held to confer the highest right in the division of the yet unappropriated earth. As an illustration, let us suppose for a moment men thrown upon an uninhabited island: as long as the hope of escape remained, if they had families, they would simply confine themselves to the preparation of some means of shelter from the weather; but as soon as the conviction arose that they must pass their lives where they were, an allotment of the land would take place, and each would claim that which was *nearest* to his own dwelling, and which on that account would be considered as his *own* property. The connection of this word with the idea of *nearness* is thus established, as well as with that of *property*. Its original signification therefore seems to be CLOSE, and the difference between it and उप *upa* is that the latter means *proximity* in a general sense, while सु *su* implies *close contact;* an idea supported by the English verb *to meet*, which gives rise to the adjectives *meet*, *proper*, *right*, *good*, &c.; and to be *fitting*, that is, *to be right*, *proper*, *good*, &c. and which springs from the idea of things that *fit together*. The sense of *good* springs naturally from the idea of what belongs *to ourselves* in relation to the individual, the family, or the nation; thus *our own* opinions, *our own* family descent and customs, *our own* national qualities, we must from our very nature consider as better than those of others; and so true is language to this leading idea, that we call our property our *goods* (in French *nos biens*). This subject may be further illustrated by a reference to the Persian: M. Burnouf's researches have demonstrated that the Sanskrit स्वदत्तस् *swa-dattas*, *self-given*, *self-manifested*, (Latin *sui datus*) is the original of the Zend *kadáta*, from this comes the modern Persian خدا *khudá*, which is identical with the Saxon and English *God*. In a similar manner, the Sanskrit स्वस् *su+as*, *own*, having given birth to the Persian *khú+d*, *own*, *self*, (the letter د *d* being the pleonastic letter in Persian as in Latin) would lead to the belief that this last word is the original of the Saxon ȝoꝺ and English *good*.

The truth of the foregoing inquiry is singularly confirmed by a reference to the Greek; for the preposition εὖ *good* gives birth to the adjectives ἐός *good*, and the connection of ἑός *his own* with εὖ *good*, in the same way as सु *su*, *good*, with स्वस् *su+as*, his own, is thus brought to light perhaps for the first time. The Greek aspirate in the above and other instances takes the place of the Latin and Sanskrit *s*, and is therefore quite

সুপথ *supatha, an* excellent, *or* good *road.* 2. *Fitness,* or *propriety;* as সুখাদ্য *sukhádya* (fit, *or* proper *to be eaten*): *wholesome.* 3. *Beauty;* as সুরঙ্গ *suranga* (beautiful *in colour*): *the orange.* 4. *Kindness;* as সুহৃৎ *suhrit* (*a* kind *heart*): *a friend.* 5. *Facility;* as সুকর *sukara* (easily *done*): *practicable.* 6. *Pleasingness;* as সুখ *sukha* (pleasing *the senses*): *pleasure.* 7. *Superiority;* as সুবর্ণ *suvarna* (superior *class, or colour* (*to silver*): *gold* Compare দুর্ব্বর্ণ *silver*). 8. *Intensity;* as সুতীক্ষ্ণ *sutíkshna,* very *acute.* It is exactly the reverse of *dur* or *dus,* and agrees in signification and origin with the Greek εὖ.

দুর্ *dur.* BAD:* figur. *improper, vile, unfit, difficult, displeasing, paucity,* &c.

দুঃ *duh,* দুশ্ *dus,* দুষ্ *dush,* দুস্ *dus,* are forms which it must assume according to the consonant with which the word it is prefixed to may begin.

As it is exactly the reverse of সু *su,* it is employed to depreciate the nouns and adjectives to which it is joined; on this account it denotes 1. *Vileness,* or *badness;* as দুরধ্ব *duradhwa, a* bad *road:* 2. *Unfitness* or *impropriety;* as দুরালাপ *durálápa* (improper *speech*): *abuse.* 3. *Difficulty;* as দুশ্চর *duschara* (difficult *to go*): *impracticable.* 4. *Displeasingness;* as দুঃখ *duhkha* (displeasing *to the senses*): *pain.* 5. *Paucity;* as দুর্ব্বল *durbala* (*of* little *strength*): *weak.* 6. *Inferiority;* as দুর্ব্বর্ণ *durvarna* (inferior *class, or colour* (*to gold*) (compare সুবর্ণ *gold*): *silver.* The Greek δυς, and the Latin *dis,* seem to have a perfect analogy with it, in sense and origin.

Though, strictly speaking, the following words are adverbs, yet as they are very frequently used in the same manner as prepositions, they are on this account inserted immediately after them.

অধস্ *adhas.* DOWN, DOWNWARDS, BELOW: figur. *low, vile.* অধঃ *adhah,* অধর্ *adhar,* অধশ্ *adhas,* অধো *adho,* are forms which it may occasionally assume when in composition.

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quite distinct from the *digamma.* If there is any truth in this argument, the original sense of সু must be CLOSE or NEAR, from which is derived the idea of *own*; and, from own, GOOD.

* Nearly all that has been said regarding সু *su* will, in a reversed sense, apply to this preposition. Whatever was distant, was considered as *bad:* in this way, *foreign, outlandish, strange,* &c. are always used by the vulgar with a deteriorating sense, and hence I have little doubt that this preposition is connected in origin with the Sanskrit দূর *dúra, distant.* The English word *bad* is evidently the same as the Persian بد *bad;* and if we had any evidence that the Scandinavian nations migrated from the shores of the Caspian *after* the intermixture of the Medes and Persians, I would almost without hesitation refer the origin of the Persian بد *bad* to some Syriac form connected with the Arabic بعد *buad, distance;* for we know that the Pahlevi or *border* language was a mixture of a Syriac dialect with the old Persic, and this supposition would satisfactorily account for the many words apparently of the Semitic stock found in the Teutonic dialects. The original signification of দুর্ *dur* must therefore be FAR, from which is derived the idea of BAD.

অন্তর্ *antar*, অন্তঃ *antah*, অন্তস্ *antas*, &c. *Within, between, among.* It is the same as the Latin *inter*.

ঔপরি *upari*. ABOVE or OVER: figur. *Exceeding, surpassing.*

It is identified in origin and signification with the Greek ὑπὲρ, the Latin *super*, the Gothick *ufar*, and the English *over*.

পুরস্ *puras*. IN FRONT, BEFORE: figur. *prior, first.* পুরঃ *purah*, পুরশ্ *puras*, পুরো *puro*, are forms which it may occasionally assume. It seems identified with the Greek πρὸς.

বহিস্ *vahis*. OUT, OUTWARDS, EXTERNAL. বহিঃ *vahih*, বহির্ *vahir*, বহিশ্ *vahis*, are forms which it may occasionally assume.

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